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“Rather than serving in the U.S. Senate for almost 20 years, or having
so many other wonderful life experiences, I could have served a longer
sentence in prison for some of the stupid, reckless things I did as a teenager.
I am grateful to have gotten a second chance—and I believe our society
should make a sustained investment in offering second chances to our
1
youth.”
—Alan K. Simpson, U.S. Senator
I.

INTRODUCTION

Any individual under the age of eighteen is considered a
2
juvenile and is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
Under this framework, a juvenile committing an offense is subject
to an adjudication of delinquency rather than a criminal
3
4
conviction. The juvenile court system adjudicates juveniles with an
eye on rehabilitation, geared toward recognizing the “unique
5
characteristics and needs of children.” The system is designed to
1. Alan K. Simpson, A Sentence Too Cruel for Children, WASH. POST, Oct. 23,
2009, at A25, available at LEXIS.
2. MINN. STAT. §§ 260B.101, subdiv. 1, 260B.007 (2012). An individual may
be removed from juvenile court and certified as an adult for proceedings if that
individual is at least fourteen years old and has committed an offense that would
be a felony if committed by an adult. Id. § 260B.125, subdiv. 1. Juvenile is defined
as “[a] person who has not reached the age (usu. 18) at which one should be
treated as an adult by the criminal-justice system; MINOR.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 945 (9th ed. 2009).
3. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.001, subdiv. 2; see also id. § 260B.245, subdiv. 1(a)
(“No adjudication upon the status of any child in the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court shall operate to impose any of the civil disabilities imposed by conviction,
nor shall any child be deemed a criminal by reason of this adjudication, nor shall
this adjudication be deemed a conviction of crime . . . .”).
4. Unlike adult criminal proceedings, juvenile courtrooms are generally
sealed to the public. Id. § 260B.163, subdiv. 1(c). Additionally, unless an exception
applies, juvenile records are sealed to the public as well. Id. § 260B.171,
subdiv. 4(b). Finally, even if a juvenile’s record is accessible under an exception, if
an expungement is granted, the very nature of one makes the record inaccessible
to the public. Due to privacy concerns over a juvenile’s judicial proceedings,
significant research in the area of juvenile expungements has been limited.
5. Id. § 260B.001, subdiv. 2; see also COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, JUVENILE
RECORDS IN MINNESOTA 4 (2014), available at http://www.crimeandjustice.org
/researchReports/Juvenile%20Records%20in%20Minnesota.pdf (“In contrast to
adult criminal court, juvenile court was fundamentally rehabilitative, adopting a
parens patriae doctrine, in which the state intervened as a child’s guardian,
protecting a child from her own wrongdoings and those of adults around her.”
(citing Perry L. Moriearty, Combating the Color-Coded Confinement of Kids: An Equal
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provide extensive judicial discretion over unlawful behavior that
originates not so much from inherent criminality, but rather from a
6
failed or underutilized social environment. Because of this, the
courts function from the standpoint that there will at some point
be a second chance for that juvenile. If nothing else, that juvenile
has until the age of eighteen to stay out of the criminal court
system. However, even if they have had no other brushes with the
law, thousands of Minnesota youths are adversely affected by their
7
juvenile adjudications. A juvenile’s delinquency adjudication can
have far-reaching ramifications that are felt long after an individual
has left the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
8
An adjudication can carry many collateral consequences, from
9
the mere stigma of being a juvenile offender to cognizable
10
hardships in obtaining housing, employment, and education.
Although various efforts are being introduced to counter the
effects of collateral consequences on the large class of individuals
with past adjudications or convictions, these measures are a “tough
Protection Remedy, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 285, 286 (2008))).
6. See COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 4.
7. See id. Adjudications affect youth at the time of the offense, but as they
age out of the juvenile court system and attempt to seek employment, housing, or
education, adjudications can continue to have a very real adverse effect by
preventing them from entering those markets as adults.
8. See id. at 12 (“The term ‘collateral consequences’ is a catch-all used to
describe the barriers that a person might experience due to a juvenile or criminal
record.”).
9. Some sociologists posit the social theory that stigma alone can be the
barrier that keeps an individual out of the “normalized” larger group. See ERVING
GOFFMAN, STIGMA 139 (1963) (“The stigmatization of those with a bad moral record clearly can function as a means of formal social control; the stigmatization of
those in certain racial, religious, and ethnic groups has apparently functioned as a
means of removing these minorities from various avenues of competition . . . .”);
see also Prison and Beyond: A Stigma That Never Fades, ECONOMIST (Aug. 8, 2002),
http://www.economist.com/node/1270755 (“This keenness to lock people up is
matched by a complete lack of interest in them when they get out.”). Speaking of
stigma, “A survey of employers in five large cities found that 65% would not
knowingly hire an ex-convict,” adding that “[a]nother facet of the ‘tough on
crime’ movement has been to exclude ex-convicts from certain kinds of
employment.” Id.
10. See Jon Geffen & Stefanie Letze, Chained to the Past: An Overview of
Criminal Expungement Law in Minnesota—State v. Schultz, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1331, 1333 (2005). While Geffen & Letze mention only housing and employment,
the decision in J.J.P. expands that framework to include obstacles in the area of
education. In re Welfare of J.J.P. (J.J.P. II), 831 N.W.2d 260, 270 (Minn. 2013).
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sell” to legislators and judges when many jurisdictions have a
11
“tough on crime” stance. Nevertheless, past offenders have at least
one legal remedy in the form of expungement to alleviate the
collateral consequences of a past adjudication.
Expungements are a legislatively driven primary tool used by
12
the judiciary to directly counter the effects of a past adjudication.
They are the court-ordered sealing of government-held criminal or
13
delinquency records of an individual. Under Minnesota law,
individuals who have committed juvenile offenses are entitled to
petition for an expungement of any adjudication records held by
the district court. If the petitioner’s request is granted upon a
14
demonstrated showing of need, that individual is entitled to have
15
that record erased as if the event never occurred. Theoretically,
this should enable the petitioner to move forward in obtaining
housing, education, and employment without the blemish of his or
her past offense. However, as this note explains, under the recent
Minnesota Supreme Court decision of In re Welfare of J.J.P.,
petitioners may not see the practical solutions the court intended
16
to grant through the expungement process.
This case note begins with a short history of the juvenile justice
system before examining the statutory framework and prior case
17
law involving juvenile expungements. It will then focus on the
details of the J.J.P. case, encapsulating both the Minnesota Court of
11. One such effort is Minnesota’s “Ban the Box” measure, allowing
Minnesota’s portion of the millions of Americans with past convictions a second
chance at an opportunity for employment. See MDHR Offers Employers a Toolkit on
Minnesota’s New ‘Ban the Box’ Law Signed by Governor Mark Dayton Today, OFF.
GOVERNOR BLOG (June 5, 2013, 12:08 PM), http://mn.gov/governor/blog/the
-office-of-the-governor-blog-entry-detail.jsp?id=102-62169.
12. MINN. STAT. § 260B.198, subdiv. 6 (2012); Expungement in Minnesota,
COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUST., http://crimeandjustice.org/councilinfo.cfm?pID=100
(last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
13. See Expungement in Minnesota, supra note 12 (explaining that an
expungement is not the “destruction of the records”).
14. The test is one of balancing whether an expungement of the
adjudicating order would “yield a benefit to the petitioner that outweighs the
detriment to the public in sealing the record and the burden on the court in
issuing, enforcing, and monitoring the expungement order.” J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d
at 270.
15. Id. at 267 (citing Barlow v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 365 N.W.2d 232
(Minn. 1985)).
16. See id.
17. See infra Part II.
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18

Appeals and Minnesota Supreme Court decisions. This note will
argue that while the Minnesota Supreme Court may have intended
to provide solid footing for expungements in the wake of the
decision, the court failed to provide many petitioners actual relief
19
under Minnesota Statutes section 260B.198, subdivision 6. This
note will then analyze the implications of the J.J.P. decision on
petitioners and address the gaps left by the majority decision as it
relates to relief sought by a petitioner in the areas of employment,
20
housing, and education. Finally, this note will provide suggestions
for possible legislative reform to remedy the ineffectiveness of the
21
current statute.
II. HISTORY
A.

History of the Juvenile Justice System

The philosophy separating the juvenile justice system from the
22
criminal courts has a deep, historical origin. One of the early
shifts occurred in the late seventeenth century, as an emphasis on
the Christian example of moral living began to transform family
23
dynamics and childrearing. This emphasis on good childrearing
gave way to a permissible intervention by officials into the privacy of
24
the nuclear family. In fact, the “[p]ublic interest in nurturing and
protecting children became the focal point during the last three
25
decades of the nineteenth century.” This time period, known as
the Progressive Era, saw the emergence of a wealthy, white upper
class that was “fearful of social disorder and dismayed by the
26
poverty, disease, and lawlessness of urban life.” This gave rise to
various organizations with prescribed police powers whose mission
was clear: to save poor and neglected children, or ones who had

18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.A.
20. See infra Part IV.A.2–3.
21. See infra Part IV.B.
22. See Wright S. Walling & Stacia Walling Driver, 100 Years of Juvenile Court in
Minnesota—a Historical Overview and Perspective, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 883,
885–89 (2006) (tracing the lineage of the juvenile justice system from the Middle
Ages to present day).
23. Id. at 885.
24. Id. at 886–87.
25. Id. at 888.
26. Id. (citing ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY 70 (1987)).
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27

been involved in delinquent acts. Essentially, “[t]his world view
prompted compulsory education laws, new schools and vocational
institutions, restructured curricula, and restrictions on child labor.
It also led to the establishment of the federal Children’s Bureau
and . . . the creation of the first juvenile court in the United
28
States.”
The first juvenile court was created in Chicago, Illinois,
29
in 1899. During its formative years, the court was intentionally
separated from the criminal system because the creators believed
that “criminal statutes, which for hundreds of years had essentially
viewed children as adults by the age of seven, were a total failure in
30
deterring the criminal behavior of children.”
The juvenile justice system was formed with an eye toward the
31
power of parens patriae, which was an extremely deliberate
departure from the criminal courts. The founders of the system
envisioned the judge “[s]eated at a desk, with the child at his side,
where he can on occasion put his arm around his shoulder and
32
draw the lad to him.” Because of this insistency that children were
33
not merely “miniature adults,” the courts developed this system
separately to avoid the constitutional due process constraints
34
required in adult court.
The first juvenile court statute in Minnesota was enacted
in 1905, clearly reflecting the social movements occurring at the
35
national level. Throughout the early 1900s, Minnesota kept pace
27. Id.
28. Id. at 889.
29. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909). The
juvenile justice system emerged out of the passage of the first juvenile court act in
Illinois, which was formed through initiatives led by social reformers interested in
such causes as prison reform, employment issues, women’s suffrage, and poverty
law. See Walling & Driver, supra note 22, at 889–90.
30. Walling & Driver, supra note 22, at 890–91 (citing MONRAD G. PAULSEN &
CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, JUVENILE LAW AND PROCEDURE 1 (N. Corinne Smith ed.,
1974)).
31. Parens patriae literally means “parent of his or her country” and as a
doctrine refers to the state as a provider of protection to those unable to care for
themselves. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009).
32. Mack, supra note 29, at 120.
33. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2397 (2011).
34. Jennifer Park, Balancing Rehabilitation and Punishment: A Legislative
Solution for Unconstitutional Juvenile Waiver Policies, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 786,
791–92 (2008).
35. Walling & Driver, supra note 22, at 896. Minnesota was one of the most
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with the national struggle between this parens patriae philosophy
and the growing trend toward due process requirements for
36
juvenile courts. The Juvenile Court Act of 1917 forbade a juvenile
37
adjudication to be considered a conviction of a crime, and in
1922, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided that “determinations
of delinquency did not require due process because it is the ‘right
38
of the state to step in and save the child.’” The philosophy
surrounding the juvenile court system started to shift toward the
middle of the twentieth century.
One of the earliest acknowledgements that there may be
constitutional questions regarding juvenile adjudications came in
1957 with an article entitled Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, in which
the author questioned what practical differences were present
between the criminal and juvenile court systems if the outcomes
39
were similar. Moments like this reaffirmed the state’s longstanding commitment to treating juvenile offenses differently than
criminal convictions—even with shifts of statutory language
throughout the years away from a paternalistic core to more
40
punitive in nature.
In the 1960s, advocates who feared that juvenile court
proceedings placed children in a sort of purgatory—the possible
loss of personal liberties without the presence of constitutional due
41
process requirements—began to challenge the system. In a series
of pivotal U.S. Supreme Court cases, due process requirements
progressive states in the early 1900s in regard to its juvenile justice system.
Id. at 900.
36. Id. at 910–11.
37. Act effective Jan. 1, 1918, ch. 397, § 21, 1917 Minn. Laws 561, 570 (“The
adjudication of a juvenile court that a child is delinquent shall in no case be
deemed a conviction of crime . . . .”).
38. John M. Stuart & Amy K.R. Zaske, What Does a “Juvenile Adjudication”
Mean in Minnesota? Some New Answers After a Century of Change in Juvenile Court,
32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 919, 923 (2006) (quoting Peterson v. McAuliffe, 151
Minn. 467, 469, 187 N.W. 226, 226 (1922)).
39. See Monrad G. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV.
547, 550 (1957) (“If the result of an adjudication of delinquency is substantially
the same as a verdict of guilty, the youngster has been cheated of his constitutional
rights by false labeling. We cannot take away precious legal protection simply by
changing names from ‘criminal prosecution’ to ‘delinquency proceedings.’”).
40. See Stuart & Zaske, supra note 38, at 927 (noting the 1980s shift in
statutory language from importance on rehabilitation to that of public safety).
41. See Courtney P. Fain, What’s in a Name? The Worrisome Interchange of
Juvenile “Adjudications” with Criminal “Convictions,” 49 B.C. L. REV. 495, 501 (2008).
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were largely instilled into the juvenile justice system, but even
today juveniles are not entitled to a jury trial unless they are
43
transferred to adult court and tried there. In In re Gault, the Court
affirmed that “some due process guarantees could no longer be
withheld from juveniles under the guise of offering juveniles
rehabilitation instead of punishment,” and that extending these
“due process requirements would not destroy the uniqueness of the
44
juvenile court.”
Although the due process requirements that have been
extended to juvenile courts cannot be displaced by state
legislatures, the “jurisdiction and purpose of the court is at the
mercy of legislative will and can be changed to address problematic
45
social issues.” Over the years, due to increased rates of youth
violence, combined with a “tough on crime” stance, the courts have
been trending toward a more punitive stance.
Between 1992 and 1997, state laws in forty-five states made
it easier to transfer juveniles into the adult system, thirtyone states increased the sentencing options for juveniles,
and forty-seven states removed juvenile court confidentiality protections, resulting in more public proceedings and greater access to juvenile records. Further,
although in most states the juvenile court has original
jurisdiction for all persons under the age of eighteen, in
some states the juvenile court jurisdiction ends at ages
fifteen or sixteen; juveniles in these states have not yet
reached the age of majority but are categorically
considered adults for the purpose of assessing criminal
46
responsibility.
For instance, in recent years, courts across the country have
increasingly held that juvenile adjudications can be used to impact
47
sentencing during a subsequent adult conviction. The trend

42. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
43. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545 (“[T]rial by jury in the juvenile court’s
adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement.”).
44. Fain, supra note 41, at 502 (citing Gault, 387 U.S. at 27–28).
45. Id. at 504.
46. Id. at 504–05.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2007);
United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1190–91 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 696 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030,
1032–33 (8th Cir. 2002).
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toward recognizing juvenile adjudications for the purposes of
sentencing enhancements for adult convictions suggests that they
are equivalent to adult convictions, at least in reference to the
argument that the juvenile justice system is ever-increasingly more
punitive than rehabilitative.
B.

Juvenile Expungement Statute 260B.198

Juvenile expungement requests are governed by Minnesota
Statutes section 260B.198, subdivision 6: “Except when legal
custody is transferred under the provisions of subdivision 1,
clause (4), the court may expunge the adjudication of delinquency
48
at any time that it deems advisable.”
The earliest incarnation of the juvenile expungement statute
49
was in 1959. It read, “Except when legal custody is transferred
under the provisions of subdivision 1, clause (d), the court may,
50
within 90 days, expunge the adjudication of delinquency.” In
51
1961, the legislature amended the statute to its modern phrasing.
In the span of these two years, the legislature removed the
restrictive ninety-day window and gave the district court judge the
discretionary power to make case-by-case decisions regarding
52
juvenile delinquents.
In the fifty-two years since, the legislature has not amended or
53
expanded the statute. The scarcity of cases interpreting the statute

48. MINN. STAT. § 260B.198, subdiv. 6 (2012). Subdivision 1, clause 4 states
that an expungement is applicable unless there has been a “transfer [of] legal
custody by commitment to the commissioner of corrections.” Id. § 260B.198,
subdiv. 1.
49. See Act effective July 1, 1959, ch. 685, sec. 28, § 260.185, subdiv. 2, 1959
Minn. Laws 1275, 1293 (amended 1961).
50. Id.
51. See Act approved Apr. 20, 1961, ch. 576, sec. 13, § 260.185, subdiv. 2, 1961
Minn. Laws 1035, 1039.
52. See id. An alternate reading of the statutory shift is plausible. Since the
phrase “within 90 days” was deleted, and “at any time it deems advisable” was
simultaneously added, the phrase may be strictly construed to be a technicality
regarding time. However, this has not been the interpretation. Instead, the widely
understood interpretation has been concerned with the district court judge’s
discretion.
53. Section 260.185 was repealed in 1999 and replaced with
section 260B.198. See Act of May 11, 1999, ch. 139, art. 2, sec. 30, § 260B.198,
subdiv. 5, 1999 Minn. Laws 567, 619 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT.
§ 260B.198 (2012)). Any revisions to the statute did not affect the subdivision
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perhaps solidifies the fact that until J.J.P., there had not been a
need. This is the extent of any statutory direction for petitioners
seeking an expungement of their juvenile records. In contrast, the
adult statute is robust and offers petitioners guidance on content,
54
service, process, and other general requirements. In the past, this
vagueness forced practitioners and pro se petitioners to rely on the
55
adult statute. As this note will discuss, without legislative
intervention, anyone seeking an expungement of his or her
juvenile record will need to continue to rely on the adult statute for
many of these procedural elements.
C.

Lack of Relevant Case History Before J.J.P.

The lack of relevant case history predating J.J.P. is striking.
Most challenges have been filed under chapter 609A in regard to
56
the court’s inherent authority to expunge records. A district court
has inherent authority to expunge its own records, so the question
has been whether judicial inherent authority may extend outside

concerning expungements and is therefore irrelevant in this discussion.
54. See MINN. STAT. ch. 609A. The statute authorizes the district court to seal
the records and prohibit any disclosure of their existence. Id. § 609A.01. It governs
adult criminal offenses and convictions by juveniles who were prosecuted as adults.
Id. § 609A.02, subdiv. 2. Standing in stark contrast to the court’s ruling in J.J.P.
regarding section 260B.198, subdivision 6, criminal proceedings not resulting in a
conviction are explicitly subject to consideration for an expungement. Id.
§ 609A.02, subdiv. 3. An expungement of an adult record is by no means easy;
rather, it
is an extraordinary remedy to be granted only upon clear and
convincing evidence that it would yield a benefit to the petitioner
commensurate with the disadvantages to the public and public safety
of: (1) sealing the record; and (2) burdening the court and public
authorities to issue, enforce, and monitor an expungement order.
Id. § 609A.03, subdiv. 5. The Minnesota Supreme Court decided a case affecting
adult expungement requests under chapter 609A the same day as it decided
J.J.P. II. See State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276 (Minn. 2013).
55. J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d 260, 269 (Minn. 2013) (noting that the “district
court applied the standards that govern expungement of adult criminal records
under chapter 609A”).
56. For an explanation on the difference between statutory and inherent
authority, see Expungement Working Group, Continuation of Presentation from
House Research and Senate Counsel, at 5:00, MINN. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES (Oct. 22,
2013) [hereinafter Expungement Working Group Meeting #2], available at http://www
.house.leg.state.mn.us/comm/workinggroups/expungaudio.asp (statement of
Kathleen Pontius, Senate Counsel at Minnesota Senate).
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the judicial branch. The lack of precedent is due not only to the
57
private nature of juvenile court proceedings, but may also be
because juvenile expungements have been underutilized due to the
58
lack of guidance under both the statute and case law. Most cases
were routed as inherent authority cases, which provided limited
59
relief because they addressed only judicial records.
III. THE J.J.P. DECISION
A.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2002, at the age of seventeen, J.J.P. broke into the Town
and Country Golf Course in St. Paul, Minnesota and attempted to
60
steal food and beverage items from the snack bar. Within two
weeks, he was arrested for shoplifting a pair of shoes from a
61
department store. The State charged J.J.P. with felony seconddegree burglary and misdemeanor theft, and he admitted to both
62
charges. In September of that year, the Hennepin County District
63
Court adjudicated him delinquent on both counts.
In 2007, J.J.P. was working both as a licensed emergency
medical technician and firefighter while studying to become a
64
paramedic. At that point, he filed a pro se petition requesting an
65
expungement of any records held by the court. He did not,
however, specifically request expungement of any records held by
the Department of Human Services (DHS), the agency responsible
for performing background checks for various state licensing

57. See MINN. STAT. §§ 260B.163, subdiv. 1(c), 260B.171, subdiv. 4(b).
58. See Lindsay Davis, Minnesota Criminal Expungement Law: Current Law,
Updates, and Alternatives, MSBA FAM. L. SEC., http://www.mnbar.org/sections
/family-law/2012-13%20Notices/9-8-12%20Lindsay%20Davis%20Power%20Point
.pdf.
59. See Jane F. Pribek, Minnesota Courts Get Leeway to Expunge Juvenile Records,
MINN. LAW. (Jan. 27, 2012), 2012 WLNR 28751582, for an example of how an
expungement of judicial records does not affect all applicable criminal records
held by state agencies.
60. J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d 125, 127 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d 260.
61. J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d at 262.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 263.
65. J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d at 127.
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66

needs. Based on this first request, the court granted J.J.P.’s
petition for expungement but limited the order to “[a]ll official
records held by the Fourth Judicial District Court–Juvenile
Division, other than the non-public record retained by the Bureau
of Criminal Apprehension (BCA), including all records relating to
67
arrest, indictment or complaint, trial, dismissal and discharge.”
J.J.P. continued his studies to become a paramedic, and in
2010, the college requested that DHS conduct a background check
to determine whether he was qualified for the position under state
68
law. Even though the district court had granted J.J.P.’s request for
expungement of judicial records, the files held by BCA still existed
and DHS therefore had access to them. Based upon this
adjudication record, DHS “concluded that J.J.P. was barred from
‘any position allowing direct contact with, or access to, persons
receiving services from programs licensed by DHS and the
69
Minnesota Department of Health.’” J.J.P. was disqualified from
70
being a paramedic based upon DHS’s finding.
Later that same year, J.J.P. again filed a petition with the
district court to expunge his executive branch records, “including
those held by the BCA, DHS, and Minnesota Department of Health
71
72
(MDH).” This time, J.J.P.’s petition was denied. The district
court found that although Minnesota Statutes section 260B.198
authorized it to expunge executive branch records, J.J.P. had not
demonstrated a sufficient need for expungement as defined under
73
Minnesota Statutes chapter 609A. J.J.P. appealed, focusing on the
district court’s use of inherent authority language regarding
separation of powers to deny the expungement of his executive
74
branch records.

66. See MINN. STAT. ch. 245C (2012); J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d at 127.
67. J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d at 262 (quoting the district court order).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 263 (quoting DHS background check results).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d 125, 127 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d 260. J.J.P. brought his initial petition pro se, but he
enlisted the help of attorney Jon Geffen when he appealed.
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The Minnesota Court of Appeals Decision
75

Grappling with a case of first impression, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals viewed J.J.P. as an overall challenge to whether a
district court is authorized to expunge executive branch records
76
under Minnesota Statutes section 260B.198, subdivision 6. Up
until this point, the statute’s vague language that a court may
“expunge [an] adjudication of delinquency at any time that it
77
deems advisable” forced the district courts to rely heavily on the
adult statute to govern juvenile expungement requests. J.J.P.
provided the perfect opportunity for the courts to wrestle with this
78
issue.
In addressing the overarching issue of whether the district
courts could expunge executive branch records, the court analyzed
three separate issues: whether an expungement order granted
under section 260B.198, subdivision 6 applies to records held by
executive branch agencies such as BCA and DHS, whether there is
a separation-of-powers conflict in doing so, and whether the court
may rely on statute sections 609A.01–.03 in determining whether to
79
grant the juvenile expungement.
In deciding the first question, the court looked to statutory
80
construction and legislative intent. By arguing a plain language
interpretation of the statute—the legislature had not intended to
restrict the meaning to limit expungements solely to judicial
branch records—J.J.P. convinced the court that the broad language
of the statute should expand the court’s authority in expungements
81
rather than restrict it.
After deciding that the statute was unambiguous regarding any
limitation or restriction that could keep the court in a case like
J.J.P.’s from extending its expungement powers to executive
branch records, the issue of statutory interpretation dissipated. Yet,

75. Id. at 126.
76. Id. at 128.
77. MINN. STAT. § 260B.198, subdiv. 6 (2012).
78. The factors of J.J.P.’s case were all favorable for this argument because
J.J.P. committed a crime of nonviolence, it had been several years since the
adjudication, he was on a professional career path, and he had no subsequent
adjudications. See J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d at 127.
79. Id. at 128–30.
80. See id. at 128–29.
81. See id. at 128.
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statutory interpretation would have supported the court’s ultimate
82
decision anyway :
[C]ourts presume that the legislature does not intend
results that are “absurd, impossible of execution, or
unreasonable.” If we were to construe section 260B.198,
subdivision 6, as inapplicable to records held by executive
branch agencies, juvenile delinquents could receive less
expungement relief than some juveniles who are certified
for prosecution as adults and criminally convicted. But . . .
the legislature has authorized remedies for juveniles who
violate criminal laws that are not available to similarly
situated adults or certified juveniles. In light of this
demonstrated intent to treat juvenile delinquents more
favorably than individuals who are convicted of crimes, it
would be absurd to construe section 260B.198, subdivision
83
6, as providing less relief than chapter 609A.
The court concluded that delinquency records held by the
executive branch agencies could be expunged under Minnesota
84
Statutes section 260B.198, subdivision 6.
The court next looked at inherent and statutory authority to
85
determine whether a separation-of-powers conflict existed. The
question was never whether the court had the authority to expunge
86
its own records under the judiciary’s inherent authority, but
instead whether the court was required to exercise deference and
restraint outside of the judicial branch “where statutes require that
87
some of the records be kept open to the public.”
The court noted that inherent judicial authority over executive
branch records should be used sparingly and with restraint “in light
of the deference that courts . . . afford the other branches of

82. See id.
83. Id. at 129.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See State v. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763, 766 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (noting
that the judiciary’s inherent authority extends only to its “unique judicial
functions”).
87. J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d at 129 (citing State v. S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d 271, 279
(Minn. 2008)). One executive branch agency keeping abreast of changes in the
law is DHS. DHS’s power to review criminal records is statutorily driven. See MINN.
STAT. ch. 245C (2012). This thorough statute governs everything from who may be
subject to a background study, when it might occur, what is required, the
disqualifying offenses, and remedies after a denial. Id.
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88

government,” but there is no separation-of-powers conflict if the
89
power to expunge is statutorily driven. Under this analysis, the
90
separation-of-powers conflict issue became much clearer. The
court concluded that unlike using its inherent authority, there is no
separation-of-powers conflict when the judiciary expunges a record
pursuant to statutory authority in accordance with the authority of
91
the executive and legislative branches.
Finally, the court addressed whether the district court’s
reliance on Minnesota Statutes chapter 609A was proper in guiding
92
the decision to grant a juvenile expungement. This chapter
93
governs expungements of criminal convictions. The State argued
that this chapter was properly used to govern the request for a
juvenile expungement because it “provides the grounds and
procedures for expungement of criminal procedures under
94
[several statutes], or other applicable law.” The court narrowed in on
the use of “criminal records” in the statute to determine that it was
not intended to apply to juveniles unless the juvenile was tried as an
95
adult.
The use of the phrase “criminal record” is significant
because the legislature has determined that “[n]o
adjudication upon the status of any child in the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall operate to impose
any of the civil disabilities imposed by conviction, nor
shall any child be deemed a criminal by reason of this
adjudication, nor shall this adjudication be deemed a conviction
of crime, except as otherwise provided in this section or
96
section 260B.255.”
88. J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d at 129.
89. Id.
90. DHS itself recognizes the court’s authority to expunge executive branch
records. See MINN. STAT. § 245C.08, subdiv. 1(b) (noting that as long as proper
service has been received, DHS will comply with a court-ordered expungement);
see also In re H.A.L., 828 N.W.2d 476, 479 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (explaining that
when proper service is effectuated, “it is then within the district court’s sound
discretion to determine whether to order DHS to seal its records and effectuate a
complete expungement”).
91. J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d at 130.
92. See id.
93. MINN. STAT. § 609A.01.
94. J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d at 130 (alteration in original).
95. See id. (“This chapter provides the grounds and procedures for
expungement of criminal records . . . .” (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609A.01)).
96. Id. (alteration in original) (citing MINN. STAT. § 260B.245, subdiv. 1(a)).
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This seems to be reaffirmed by the goal of the Minnesota Rules of
Juvenile Delinquency Procedure, which state that the general
purpose of the laws relating specifically to children is to “promote
the public safety” by “developing individual responsibility for lawful
behavior” while giving “children access to opportunities for
97
personal and social growth.” Several dispositional options for a
juvenile court again reaffirm that the system was designed with a
98
different intent than that of the adult criminal court. For instance,
the option of a stay of adjudication is statutorily available for
99
juvenile offenders, whereas for adults in criminal cases it is not.
Regarding expungements, the statutes offer the juvenile courts
100
more latitude for relief.
Ultimately, because the district court found that a juvenile
adjudication is not the same thing as a criminal conviction
resulting in a criminal record, applying adult criminal guidelines to
101
a juvenile adjudication was improper. Instead, the court “must be
guided by the principles that govern dispositional decision-making”
102
in juvenile cases. The court of appeals shifted away from chapter
609A to a new standard: the dispositional guidelines found in Rule
103
15.05 of the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure.
Driven by the policy-based, rehabilitative focus of the juvenile
court system, the court reversed and remanded the case to the
104
district court,
“concluding that the district court abused its

97. MINN. R. JUV. DELINQ. P. 1.02 (“The purpose of the laws relating to
children alleged or adjudicated to be delinquent is to promote the public safety
and reduce juvenile delinquency by maintaining the integrity of the substantive
law prohibiting certain behavior and by developing individual responsibility for
lawful behavior.”). Compare this with the purpose of the Criminal Rules: “These
rules are intended to provide a just determination of criminal proceedings, and
ensure a simple and fair procedure that eliminates unjustified expense and delay.”
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 1.02.
98. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.198; J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d at 131.
99. See J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d at 131.
100. See id. (noting that the statutory authority for juvenile expungements is
largely unrestricted, unlike that for adults).
101. Id. at 130–33.
102. Id. at 132.
103. J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d at 131; see MINN. R. JUV. DELINQ. P. 15.05; J.J.P. II,
831 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn. 2013). Under the Rules of Juvenile Delinquency
Procedure, the courts must balance the best interests of the child against the risk
to public safety. MINN. R. JUV. DELINQ. P. 15.05.
104. J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d at 133.
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105

discretion in denying J.J.P.’s petition.”
With that, the State
appealed and the case moved on to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
C.

The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision

The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled on whether the district
court is authorized to expunge juvenile delinquency records from
106
executive branch agency files. In doing so, it provided new
guidelines for determining when a petition for expungement
107
should be granted.
1.

The J.J.P. Majority

The court began its analysis by reviewing the statutory
108
language of section 260B.198. The State argued that the phrase
“adjudication of delinquency” should be narrowly construed to
restrict the judiciary’s authority to court-held records, while J.J.P.
argued that the phrase extends to all records “irrespective of their
109
location.” The court reviewed both the statutory framework and
the process of how records are disseminated from their point of
origin in the judicial system to conclude that the phrase applies
specifically and solely to the “court order that adjudicates the
juvenile delinquent” and any reference to the adjudication in
110
executive branch records.
In order to decide whether J.J.P.’s executive branch records
could properly be expunged under the statute, the court wisely
traced the path of a court record through the system to the
111
executive branch agencies. With that understanding confirmed,

105. J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d at 263.
106. See id. at 262.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 263–64.
109. Id. at 263–66.
110. Id. (noting that the phrase “adjudication of delinquency” has an
“acquired, special meaning . . . in the juvenile court system” and “plainly refers to
a single event—an order—that adjudicates the juvenile delinquent”).
111. The court recognized four delinquency records at issue in J.J.P.: law
enforcement arrest and investigation records forwarded to BCA, records the
district court forwarded to BCA, records BCA collected in its juvenile history
record database, and records DHS obtained from BCA. Id. at 265. The court
analyzed how each of these of these categories is governed and disseminated by
the courts, providing much necessary illumination into the process. See id.
at 263–66.
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the court departed from the court of appeals’ ruling. In the J.J.P.
majority opinion, the court found “no legislative intent to broadly
extend” the judiciary’s ability to expunge executive branch files to
112
all records and documents held by an agency. Whereas the court
of appeals focused on not construing the vague statutory language
in a fashion that would lead to results that are “absurd, impossible
113
of execution, or unreasonable,” the Minnesota Supreme Court
focused instead on the inability to read too broadly into the statute
114
for fear of “add[ing] language to the statute that does not exist.”
The supreme court focused on an issue more specific than that of
the court of appeals: whether the district court has the ability to
expunge more than the order of adjudication from executive
115
branch files.
The court concluded that section 260B.198,
subdivision 6 “does not authorize the district court to expunge
other records in executive branch files that precede the order
116
adjudicating the juvenile delinquent,” even though it solidly
recognized that there is ample statutory authority to generally
expunge records from executive branch agencies without invoking
117
a separation-of-powers conflict.
The court next tackled the issue of whether the adult statutes
in chapter 609A should guide the district court or whether another
means would prove more beneficial in light of the rehabilitative
118
aspect of the juvenile court system. The supreme court opined
that the court of appeals incorrectly relied on Rule 15.05 of the
Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure because an
119
expungement is not an authorized disposition. Furthermore, the
112. Id. at 266.
113. J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d 125, 129 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting MINN. STAT.
§ 645.17 (2012)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d 260.
114. J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d at 266.
115. Compare J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d at 266–67, with J.J.P. I, 811 N.W.2d
at 128–29. The disparate analyses lead to the same question of legislative intent:
how are the executive-branch records affected by an expungement?
116. J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d at 267.
117. Id. In addressing the potential for a separation-of-powers conflict, the
court found that there is none. Specifically, it went further than the lower court in
finding that there was statutory protection for both the court through section
260B.198 and for DHS through section 245C.08 and that they worked together to
establish legislative intent in regard to expungements of executive-branch records.
Id. at 268–69.
118. See id. at 269.
119. Id. at 270. This is a correct finding, as a petitioner is not eligible for an
expungement at the dispositional stage. An expungement hearing is a separate
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Rules are an inappropriate guide to govern expungements, since
the petitioner has typically aged out of jurisdiction by the time he
120
or she is seeking the expungement. The court also recognized
that it is inappropriate for chapter 609A to govern juvenile
delinquency adjudications since they are not a “criminal
121
conviction.” Therefore, the court was forced to design a new
standard and concluded that the district courts should move
122
forward operating under a new balancing test. This balancing test
would give the district courts discretion when examining “whether
[an] expungement of the order adjudicating the juvenile
delinquent would yield a benefit to the petitioner that outweighs
the detriment to the public in sealing the record and the burden
on the court in issuing, enforcing, and monitoring the
123
expungement order.” Specifically, the court noted that the judge
should consider and weigh the petitioner’s interest in three crucial
124
areas: education, employment, and housing. This has become a
focus in post–J.J.P. expungement hearings. If a petitioner has not
demonstrated need in one or more of these key areas, he or she
may not have the request granted.
Related to the new balancing test is an important shift in the
burden of proof required under the new guidelines, as opposed to
the adult statute previously used to guide the juvenile courts.
Whereas chapter 609A requires the petitioner to produce clear and
convincing evidence that he or she is benefited commensurate with
the disadvantages to the public, the new guidelines only require the
petitioner to “bear[] the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that the benefit . . . outweighs the detriment to the
125
public and . . . burden on the court[s].”
With this, the court set a new standard for petitioners seeking
expungement of their juvenile records. However, the majority’s
event and often requires the passage of time to demonstrate the necessary showing
of need and rehabilitation.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 269–70.
122. Id. at 270.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. The legal burden of proof is clearly different in the two analyses
(juvenile vs. adult). Under the same set of facts, it would be easier to expunge a
juvenile case than its equivalent in adult court. However, the adult statute and case
rulings provide no limitations on what can be expunged should the district court
judge decide the petitioner has met the burden of proof.
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decision does not provide clarity because it does not offer
petitioners practical relief under the law when the district court
grants an expungement request. Justice Paul H. Anderson
narrowed in on the problems created by the majority’s decision in
his concurrence.
2.

The J.J.P. Concurrence

Justice Anderson argued that the majority was too narrow in its
holding to restrict the executive branch records solely to the order
126
of adjudication. He rested on a plain-meaning analysis of the
statutory language, particularly the words “adjudication” and
“expunge,” to conclude that the goal of an expungement could not
127
be fulfilled if the record is not completely eradicated.
To strengthen his argument, he used the Black’s Law
Dictionary’s definition of “adjudication” to illuminate that it involves
a “process,” which he felt would certainly entail a broader scope
128
than simply the order of adjudication. He noted that the plain
meaning of adjudication as noted in Black’s would necessarily
invoke more than just the “final act in the legal process—here, the
129
order adjudicating delinquency.”
Interestingly, the majority argued against adding words to the
130
statute in order to conform to a desired result, but Justice
131
Anderson argued just that in response. He said of the opinion,
“For the majority’s holding to make sense, it must . . . take the
Legislature’s wording—that courts ‘may expunge the adjudication
of delinquency’—and change that to read ‘may expunge the order
adjudicating delinquency’—thereby both substantively and substan132
tially altering the plain language of the statute.”
Anderson attacked the majority’s interpretation of the word
“expunge” as defined both by Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary to suggest that even if the court’s
narrow holding concerning adjudication was convincing, it would
133
be counterproductive to the plain meaning of “expunge.” Thus,
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See id. at 271 (Anderson, J., concurring).
Id. at 271–72.
Id. at 271.
Id.
See id. at 266 (majority opinion).
See id. at 272 (Anderson, J., concurring).
Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 260B.198, subdiv. 6 (2012)).
See id. at 272–73.
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going back to the statute, Justice Anderson concluded that the
majority’s holding cannot “give effect to the plain meaning of” an
134
expungement within the larger statutory framework. In essence,
if a district court grants an expungement of executive branch
records, the only way it works is to require all records to be
135
136
“obliterated” as if the event “never occurred.”
At this point in the concurrence, Justice Anderson provided a
137
helpful allegory. He explained what happens when milk or infant
formula stains an item of clothing, noting that even though the
garment is washed, once it is stored and put away, the protein and
iron in the milk breaks down over time to cause the stain to
138
reappear after a long dormancy in storage. He then asked
whether any parent would consider that stain expunged under the
common definitions of the word “expunge”: obliterated, utterly
139
removed from existence, made as if it never happened. His
answer was that the majority simply executed a surface scrub in
defining the scope of an expungement, only to have the offense
reappear because the “detritus of that stain remains clearly
140
visible.”
The entirety of Justice Anderson’s concurrence is packaged in
141
the idea that the majority’s holding is unsustainable. Notably,
while the majority directs the State to address its concerns to the
142
legislature, Justice Anderson rests assured that the legislature’s
intent to begin with was that an expungement would cover the
entire process of a juvenile’s adjudication and not simply the order
143
of adjudication.

134. Id. at 273.
135. Id. at 274.
136. Id. (quoting Barlow v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 365 N.W.2d 232, 233
(Minn. 1985)).
137. See id. at 274–75.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 275.
140. Id.
141. See id. Justice Anderson provided other examples of his disagreement
with the majority’s reading of the word “expunge,” notably concerning the
existing statutory schemes. Id.
142. See id. at 270 n.12 (majority opinion).
143. Id. at 275 (Anderson, J., concurring).
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision clearly changed the
way expungements can be granted by the district courts. As stated,
until the decision in J.J.P., the courts funneled most, if not all,
144
requests through chapter 609A. Now, petitioners find themselves
145
in a sort of “wild, wild west,” where Justice Anderson’s fears have
146
already started to come to fruition.
Since the ruling, petitioners are finding that many questions
are either left unanswered or simply created anew. For instance,
what happens when a charge did not result in an adjudication?
What can be done about the remaining records that were not
erased? How is the petitioner to explain an adjudication to a
potential employer who cannot see the adjudication, but can still
see the arrest record? What are the effects on immigration? This list
is far from exhaustive, yet it reinforces the need for legislative
action.
With J.J.P., petitioners “were hoping for clarity, but [they]
147
don’t have it.” In response, attorneys are preparing to bring more
expungement challenges because so many petitioners remain
148
affected through a lack of concrete relief. What follows is an
attempt to address a few of the more glaring questions left
unanswered in the wake of J.J.P.
A.

The Impact of J.J.P. on Juvenile Expungement Law in Minnesota
1.

A Stay of Adjudication Was Not Meant to Stay! The Irony of
J.J.P.

Perhaps the most significant impact on this area of law is the
lack of relief for any petitioner who was charged yet not
adjudicated. Because the majority in J.J.P. narrowly concluded that
“the phrase ‘adjudication of delinquency’ in section 260B.198,
subdivision 6 means the court order that adjudicates the juvenile

144. Expungement Law CLE, at 34:50, WM. MITCHELL COLL. L. (Aug. 14, 2013),
http://vimeo.com/72462138 (statement of Jon Geffen).
145. Id. at 51:51.
146. Id. at 50:16.
147. See id. at 54:00.
148. Telephone Interview with Jon Geffen, Att’y, Arneson & Geffen PLLC
(Oct. 9, 2013) (discussing the fact that the legislature has looked into collateral
consequences and expungements in the past without taking legislative action).
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delinquent,” the lack of effect on anything else is devastating.
Additional documents that support an adjudication are outside the
scope of relief as prescribed by J.J.P. because they precede the
“determination by the juvenile court to adjudicate the juvenile
151
delinquent.” There are many instances in which a juvenile may
not see an adjudication. The juvenile court system is rehabilitative
in nature, created to offer juveniles a second chance at redemption
before they are subject to the criminal court system. After J.J.P., the
juvenile whose case was either stayed or continued for dismissal—
where the charges were filed yet never prosecuted or were
otherwise returned in the petitioner’s favor—now finds herself with
a long-term record without any remedy by the courts when it comes
to executive branch records.
With a gaze toward the rehabilitative nature of the juvenile
justice system, it would seem that the courts were not created to
attach a “criminal” record to a juvenile delinquent, especially with
an individual who was never adjudicated. “To get away from the
notion that the child is to be dealt with as a criminal; to save it from
the brand of criminality; the brand that sticks to it for life; . . . to
protect it from the stigma,—this is the work [of the juvenile
152
court].” To do otherwise is to undermine the legislative and
judicial view that “what happens in juvenile court, stays in juvenile
153
court.” Additionally, it begs the question of why two distinct court
systems are still in use if the collateral consequences of each are the
same.
In ascertaining legislative intent, the courts should assume that
the legislature did not “intend a result that is absurd, impossible of
154
execution, or unreasonable.” The court in J.J.P. focused on
legislative intent in the separation-of-powers argument between the
courts and DHS, but failed to extend it to any other argument
regarding statutory construction. Because legislative enactments
should be interpreted to assume the statutes should be “effective,”
the court erred when it concluded that the scope of a district

149. J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d 260, 266 (Minn. 2013).
150. Expungement Law CLE, supra note 144, at 43:16 (statement of Jon Geffen).
151. J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d at 266.
152. Stuart & Zaske, supra note 38, at 922 (quoting Julian W. Mack, The
Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 109 (1909)).
153. Id. at 922–23.
154. MINN. STAT. § 645.17 (2012).
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court’s statutory authority to expunge an executive branch record
155
is limited to the order of adjudication.
As the court of appeals and Justice Anderson correctly noted,
limiting the scope of an expungement to the order of adjudication
runs counter to legislative intent. Furthermore, without consulting
156
a professional, a pro se petitioner with a record that contains a
stay of adjudication will most likely have no idea that he or she is
157
unable to find relief. This reinforces the need for legislative
action on the subject. With the recent formation of the state’s
Expungement Working Group and the call for legislative action by
practitioners involved in juvenile expungements, legislative action

155. See id.; see also Schatz v. Interfaith Care Ctr., 811 N.W.2d 643, 651
(Minn. 2012) (“When construing a statute, we presume that the Legislature did
not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable.”); Lewis-Miller v. Ross, 710
N.W.2d 565, 569 (Minn. 2006) (“When interpreting legislative enactments, we
must presume that the legislature intended its statutes to be ‘effective,’ and not
‘productive of absurd . . . or unreasonable’ results.”); State ex rel. Beaulieu v.
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 624, 533 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1995) (“[T]here is a
presumption that the legislature does not intend a result that is unreasonable.”);
First Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. Comm’r of Taxation, 250 Minn. 122, 127,
84 N.W.2d 55, 59 (1957) (“[The Minnesota Supreme Court has] no right to . . .
attribute to the legislature an intent to produce an absurd and unreasonable
result.”).
156. There is strong evidence to suggest that many professionals lack the
guidance to effectively practice in this area of law. The pro se expungement packet
leads with a warning: “A petition for expungement is a complicated legal
procedure.” JUVENILE COURT, FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST.–HENNEPIN CNTY.,
EXPUNGEMENT OF YOUR JUVENILE DELINQUENCY RECORD 1 (2010), available at
http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/4/Public/Forms/Juvenile_Expungement_Single_Case_Packet.pdf. Additionally, many practitioners’ websites are out of
date. See infra note 157.
157. The packet available through the district court still contains a blank
template for two kinds of proposed orders: one for a “stay of adjudication or
adjudication” and one for “no adjudication.” There is no explanation that a
petitioner may no longer seek relief for a stay of adjudication when it comes to
executive-branch records. See JUVENILE COURT, FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST.–HENNEPIN
CNTY., supra note 156, at 12–15. Additionally, a Google search for law firms that
assist petitioners in obtaining expungements leads to website expungement
guidance that is either outdated or too vague to understand that a nonadjudication cannot be expunged from executive-branch records under J.J.P.
See, e.g., Expunging or Sealing a Juvenile Court Record in Minnesota, CRIM.
DEF. LAW., http://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/resources/criminal-defense
/expungement/juvenile-records-minnesota.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2014);
Minnesota Juvenile Conviction Expungement, RECORDGONE, http://www.recordgone
.com/minnesota/juvenile-conviction-expungement (last visited Jan. 14, 2014).
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may indeed be imminent. However, it remains to be seen how far
the legislature is willing to go in light of opposition from
prosecutors, law enforcement, and state licensing agencies who
have a valid interest in seeing more “tempered changes to [the]
158
process.” These parties have a valid interest in sustaining the
“continuous tension between the need to rehabilitate and the need
159
to punish.” Judges seem caught in the wake of this decision as
well, one stating to a petitioner, “I wish I could help you more, but
160
I can’t.” Jon Geffen, attorney for J.J.P., notes that “any substantial
change in the statute will have to come from the legislature because
161
‘we have gone as far as we can with this issue in the courts.’” He
also pushes for legislative action because the justices were
162
“hamstrung by the language of the statute.”
2.

The Current Effect of an Expungement on Records Available to
DHS

The Minnesota Supreme Court offered a “narrow . . .
imperfect remedy” for expungement of records held by executive
163
branch agencies. DHS is perhaps the agency in Minnesota most
164
affected by the court’s ruling. When prompted, DHS is statutorily
mandated to look at anything on a petitioner’s record that has not
165
been expunged. As previously noted, the only portion of a
petitioner’s record that may be expunged is the order of
166
adjudication.

158. Patrick Thornton, Group Formed to Examine Expungement Changes, MINN.
LAW., Oct. 14, 2013, at 20, 20, available at 2013 WLNR 25880659.
159. Luz A. Carrion, Rethinking Expungement of Juvenile Records in Massachusetts:
The Case of Commonwealth v. Gavin G., 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 331, 364 (2004).
160. Thornton, supra note 158, at 20 (citing St. Paul attorney Lindsay Davis’s
experience with judges).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Expungement Law CLE, supra note 144, at 53:00 (statement of Jon Geffen).
164. The supreme court limited its discussion to BCA and DHS records since
those were the only records at issue in J.J.P. See J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d 260, 276 n.6
(Minn. 2013). However, the court’s ruling suggests that the district court’s reach is
not limited to these agencies. Id. at 267 (“[T]he district court has the authority to
expunge any reference to that order in executive branch files, including in records
collected by the BCA or reviewed by DHS.” (emphasis added)).
165. See MINN. STAT. ch. 245C (2012).
166. A juvenile court record may contain any of the following: the charging
petition, summons, notice, charge, court appearance dates, detention status,
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Practitioners whose clients have had an adjudication expunged
pursuant to J.J.P. are finding that DHS is maintaining its statutory
authority, stating that there is still enough data on the record to
167
disqualify the client. DHS holds that its statutory authority under
chapter 245C allows it to include the admission and findings from a
juvenile court case when deciding whether to disqualify an
168
individual. Therefore, according to DHS, the supreme court
decision in J.J.P. does not affect the way DHS investigates a
169
juvenile’s file. In essence, J.J.P. has failed if a petitioner who has
successfully petitioned the court for an expungement finds no
remedy because of the continued existence of and reliance on
executive branch files containing everything but the order of
170
adjudication.
There are valid counterarguments to the expansion of relief
for collateral consequences of an adjudication. One counterargument is that while this may be an imperfect remedy, petitioners
who are denied employment through an agency that relies on DHS
to conduct background checks can simply go find another type of
job. This argument underestimates the reach of DHS, as out-of171
poverty jobs are highly regulated by DHS. DHS must perform
background checks on employees wishing to work in these
regulated environments, including janitorial or housekeeping,
172
maintenance, and other similar positions. In total, the Licensing
Division of DHS regulates over 22,000 programs, which includes a
number of facilities that require individuals willing to work in entrywarrants, weapons used, commitment duration, dispositions, and detention stays.
It also contains all documents filed by the court, all documents from the juvenile’s
probation officers, and county home schools or detention centers. See id.
§ 260B.171. This statute has been amended to preclude public access of
electronically stored juvenile records. Act of May 22, 2013, ch. 109, § 1, 2013 Minn.
Laws 1154 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 260B.171 (Supp. 2013)).
167. Expungement Law CLE, supra note 144, at 47:35 (statement of Jon Geffen).
168. See Expungement Working Group Meeting #2, supra note 56, at 1:45:35
(statement of Jerry Kerber, Inspector General’s Office).
169. See id.
170. This is notwithstanding DHS’s statutory authority to protect the
vulnerable populations it works with.
171. See Expungement Law CLE, supra note 144, at 48:50 (statement of Jon
Geffen); see also Background Studies, MINN. DEP’T HUM. SERVICES, http://mn.gov
/dhs/general-public/licensing (follow “Background studies” hyperlink) (last
visited Mar. 16, 2014) (stating that a background study must be initiated “before a
person has access to clients or residents or belongings” (emphasis omitted)).
172. See Background Studies, supra note 171.
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173

level, out-of-poverty positions.
DHS performs approximately
270,000 background checks each year, which breaks down to about
174
1100 per day. The agency disqualifies 8000–10,000 each year, and
175
DHS admittedly “gets it wrong” about seven percent of the time.
This affects a large number of jobs and creates real obstacles for
individuals with non-adjudications.
Under chapter 245C of the Minnesota Statutes, DHS is
authorized to conduct background studies using a preponderance
176
of the evidence standard. In doing so, the agency does not
require a conviction to disqualify an individual; it looks at the
177
individual’s conduct to predict future behavior. At this point,
DHS uses its statutory authority to make an independent
determination of the likelihood of guilt by analyzing whether the
facts of the case match the elements of the crime the individual has
178
been accused of. Even if an individual was acquitted or otherwise
found not guilty by a judge, DHS nevertheless investigates the
matter to determine anew whether that individual is “guilty”
179
enough to be barred from working in that system.
To complicate matters even more, the applicant’s only chance
180
at clarifying his or her record is post-decision. Thus, DHS adheres
to the practice of “labeling first,” then following with the right to
181
appeal. Two important issues arise from this practice. First,
employers are likely to choose another candidate if presented with
173. MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., LICENSING HUMAN SERVICES PROVIDERS
PROTECTS HEALTH, SAFETY, RIGHTS 2 (2012), available at https://edocs.dhs.state.mn
.us/lfserver/Public/DHS-4743-ENG (noting the total number of programs is
approximately 23,000).
174. Expungement Working Group Meeting #2, supra note 56, at 38:30 (statement
of Jerry Kerber, Inspector General’s Office).
175. Id. at 58:00–1:04:00 (noting that individuals have the right to appeal
DHS’s findings).
176. MINN. STAT. § 245C.14, subdiv. 1 (2012).
177. Expungement Working Group Meeting #2, supra note 56, at 55:45 (statement
of Jerry Kerber, Inspector General’s Office) (noting that a decision is based on
conduct, not conviction).
178. See id. at 58:00. This can include accusations at various stages—it need
not come from the court.
179. Id. (reiterating that DHS may disqualify people based on a
preponderance of the evidence, which aligns with its granted authority as stated in
section 245C.14).
180. See id. at 59:45.
181. Id. at 1:05:00 (clarifying that in certain circumstances, the individual may
be allowed to work during the appeals process).
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the complications of a DHS appeals process that can often take at
182
least forty-five days. Second, and more importantly, the individual
who was never adjudicated, or whose case was acquitted for another
reason, is judged anew by the agency for employment
183
consideration. This bears direct relation to the failure of J.J.P. to
give relief to juveniles who were never adjudicated, which sheds
light on the larger issue: that of the long-lingering stigma after an
individual has been “released” from the court system.
184
DHS does not support changing the existing law. The agency
stands in opposition to some practitioners and judges, using J.J.P.
to bolster its argument that the law is being appropriately
185
interpreted. Jerry Kerber, the Inspector General for DHS, sees
clarity in the court’s decision, noting that parties may not see the
186
same clarity because they disagree with the outcome. There is
validity to the adherence by DHS to its statutory authority because
of the agency’s obligation to the people it is empowered to protect.
This cannot be minimized in the conversation regarding
expungements or collateral consequences in general. Whatever the
interpretation of J.J.P. and its impact on expungements, the
movement toward some sort of legislative reform is gaining
traction, as seen through the formation of the Expungement
Working Group.
3.

Other Issues

Several issues will need to be addressed by the legislature
before the judiciary can effectively act. These problems are
practical in nature, and they affect every petitioner who seeks the
remedy of an expungement. It is outside the scope of this note to
address all of the issues facing petitioners as they move forward
after J.J.P., but it is crucial for lawmakers and practitioners to

182. See id. at 1:11:00 (statement of Rep. Carly Melin) (voicing concerns about
whether employers would really “wait around” for the applicant to have a
hearing). The disqualified individual has thirty days to contact DHS with a request
for reconsideration. MINN. STAT. § 245C.21, subdiv. 2(a) (2012). After receiving
the request, DHS has fifteen to forty-five days to respond, depending on the type
of reconsideration sought. Id. § 245C.22, subdiv. 1.
183. Expungement Working Group Meeting #2, supra note 56, at 58:00 (statement
of Jerry Kerber, Inspector General’s Office).
184. Thornton, supra note 158, at 20.
185. See id.
186. Id.
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understand what those who seek an expungement face. Because
J.J.P. both expanded and constricted juvenile expungements, the
187
effects of the new ruling are just beginning to be felt.
One problem the legislature will have to address is what the
consequences of an expungement might be on obtaining housing,
employment, or on some other external pursuit such as
188
immigration status. Because the court held that that a juvenile
expungement can only include the sealing of the order of
adjudication, arrest and various other records preceding the order
may be discoverable by officials and others making decisions about
a petitioner’s life. Those who know how to analyze an offender’s
record can still easily infer that someone was adjudicated without
189
seeing the actual order of adjudication.
Additionally, housing and employment sectors often utilize
computer data brokers to run criminal background checks on
190
applicants. For a fee, these data brokers will provide an employer
or landlord a profile of the applicant that contains any criminal
information, even if outdated. Because “[d]ata brokers are not
[always] required to update their records,” “expungement orders
187. See Expungement Law CLE, supra note 144, at 47:22. The ruling expanded
expungements in the sense that district courts are not limited to judicial-branch
records. On the other hand, the ruling constricted who may be granted an
expungement by limiting the remedy to only those individuals who were
adjudicated.
188. Aside from problems with DHS, maintaining juvenile records can have
particularly adverse effects if the petitioner “later decides to pursue a career in the
armed forces, law enforcement, politics, . . . [or] higher education.” Carrion, supra
note 159, at 335.
189. See Expungement Law CLE, supra note 144, at 48:23.
190. See Logan Danielle Wayne, The Data-Broker Threat: Proposing Federal
Legislation to Protect Post-Expungement Privacy, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 253,
253–55 (2012) (discussing the need to regulate the information private data
brokers are able to obtain on an individual). In Minnesota, data brokers are
regulated under Minnesota Statutes section 332.70. These private business
screening services may obtain criminal records and disseminate only a “complete
and accurate record.” MINN. STAT. § 332.70, subdiv. 2 (2012). Many adults are
affected by their past adjudications even though not all juvenile records are
disseminated to the public. Members of the Expungement Working Group
expressed concern that these records, while regulated, are available to anyone who
would pay the fee. See Expungement Working Group, Presentation on Expungements
from House Research and Senate Counsel, at 24:30, MINN. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES
(Sept. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Expungement Working Group Meeting #1], http://www
.house.leg.state.mn.us/comm/workinggroups/expungaudio.asp (statement of
Rep. Debra Hilstrom, Chairwoman, Expungement Working Group).
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do not apply to non-government sources,” and there are currently
few regulations to force data brokers to obtain only current and
191
correct information, petitioners may find they are denied these
192
opportunities even after an expungement. The expungement
process is confusing to begin with, and clearly petitioners who are
granted expungements are left with more than just an imprint of
their adjudications. The only remedy is the one that Justice
Anderson suggests: an alignment of the district courts’ reach in
regard to executive branch records with the purpose of an
expungement.
Another issue is that of proper service. The court has
made it abundantly clear that chapter 609A does not govern
193
juvenile expungements,
yet the current statutory framework
is so vague that petitioners are still forced to rely on the adult
statute for information regarding the proper timeframe and
194
process for service. This directly affects an agency like DHS.

191. Wayne, supra note 190, at 255. State-to-state regulations differ, but
because data brokers gather information from multiple sources across state lines,
there may be an increasing need for federal legislation. Data brokers in Minnesota
are regulated. See MINN. STAT. § 332.70. The burden is on the individual to initiate
correction of a false or outdated record. Id. § 332.70, subdiv. 3; see also Expungement
Working Group Meeting #1, supra note 190, at 32:40 (statement of Matt Gehring,
Legislative Analyst from House Research).
192. See Wayne, supra note 190, at 263–66 (discussing the need to regulate the
information private data brokers are able to obtain on an individual); Expungement
Working Group Meeting #1, supra note 190, at 28:30 (statement of Rep. Mary Liz
Holberg) (noting that there are problems with regulating what businesses can use
against applicants because the information gathered by data brokers can come
from sources not subject to legislation, such as newspaper articles). Ms. Holberg
(and others in the group) recognized that it is unrealistic for legislators to “unring
the bell,” or use a “magic eraser” to “erase any element of data around a bad time
in somebody’s life.” Id.; see also Expungement Law CLE, supra note 144, at 48:23.
193. J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d 260, 269 (Minn. 2013).
194. See Expungement Law CLE, supra note 144, at 51:50. This packet instructs
petitioners that agencies require service at least sixty-three days before the
scheduled hearing date, that those agencies have sixty days to appeal after an
order is issued, and that victims have the right to present an oral or written
statement to the court. JUVENILE COURT, FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST.–HENNEPIN CNTY.,
supra note 156, at 5–6. Under the adult statute, victims have the right to be
notified of the expungement hearing if they proactively expressed to the court or
prosecuting agency the desire to be made aware if an expungement has been
sought by the offender. MINN. STAT. §§ 611A.06, subdiv. 1a, 609A.03, subdiv. 4.
Additionally, of note is that Minnesota Statutes chapter 609A requires sixty days
service, not sixty-three. Id. § 609A.03, subdiv. 4. Still, since section 260B.198 offers
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Section 260B.198 gives no direction on service—only indirect
service through the Minnesota Attorney General’s Office.
Therefore, it would be entirely plausible for pro se petitioners to
miss that aspect of service if they were to pick up an expungement
195
packet from the district court or download it from the Internet.
This self-directed packet provides an affidavit of service, yet only
contains a pre-addressed contact for the Minnesota Attorney
196
General, the attorney for DHS. This is not direct DHS service, yet
without any statutory language in section 206B.198, petitioners
have to trust that DHS will be indirectly served through its attorney.
Without direct service, a district court judge is within her power to
deny the request for expungement of executive branch records as
197
198
held by DHS. DHS considers the statute very clear on this issue.
In line with J.J.P., the agency admits that, once granted,
expungements do reach DHS, but only after two prongs are met.
First, DHS must be directly served so that they are given an
opportunity to respond. Second, the order that is issued granting
199
the expungement needs to “specifically relate to them.”
This technicality issue is but one loophole in the statutory
framework. Unless the legislature addresses section 260B.198,
petitioners will continue to be forced to rely on chapter 609A,
which procedurally speaking is counter to the stated objective of
200
the ruling in J.J.P. Therefore, petitioners will have a difficult time
no guidance on technical requirements and individuals were consistently
deferring to chapter 609A before J.J.P., the inference can be made that
chapter 609A is still controlling on these matters, even though the packet oddly
requires sixty-three days service.
195. See JUVENILE COURT, FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST.–HENNEPIN CNTY., supra
note 156, at 5–6.
196. Id. at 5, 11; OFFICE OF THE MINN. ATTORNEY GEN., ANNUAL REPORT
REQUIRED BY MINNESOTA STATUTE SECTIONS 8.08 AND 8.15, SUBDIVISION 4 (2011):
FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 23 (2012).
197. DHS does not physically hold files, but consults BCA, which does keep
files.
198. See MINN. STAT. § 245C.08, subdiv. 1(6)(ii)(b) (“[T]he commissioner may
consider information . . . unless [DHS] received notice of the petition for
expungement and the court order for expungement is directed specifically to the
commissioner.”).
199. Expungement Working Group Meeting #2, supra note 56, at 1:16:00
(statement of Jerry Kerber, Inspector General’s Office) (admitting that DHS may
disagree with the court’s authority to issue the order, but is required to adhere to
it and may appeal if it disagrees with the outcome).
200. There is evidence to suggest that legislative reform in this area may be
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positioning themselves for success unless they are aware of every
intricate detail of the process.
B.

Suggestions for Possible Legislative Reform

Reforming the existing expungement laws in Minnesota will
undoubtedly be a daunting, complicated task. With the formation
of the legislatively based Expungement Working Group, the task is
closer than ever before. However, this is not the first working group
formed to study the collateral consequences of criminal convictions
and juvenile adjudications. In fact, legislators this time around are
charged with considering findings from previous working groups so
201
as not to re-create the wheel.
202
Expungements should never be granted lightly. With this in
mind, the goal should be to eliminate some of the collateral
consequences associated with juvenile adjudications in order to
203
rehabilitate those individuals back into society.
The everincreasing dissemination of criminal records through largely
unregulated avenues makes any kind of regulation seem overwhelming, but by focusing on controlling what is within reach, the
task becomes more manageable.
The most important objective after the J.J.P. ruling should be
to provide the judiciary with language by which they do not feel
“hamstrung.” The court has invited legislative action; in fact, it is a
key element for change in this area of the law. When the juvenile
justice system was formed, courts “did not envision themselves
creating a criminal record for each delinquent that would follow
204
him or her into adulthood.” Nor did judges intend to feel
coming. State Representative Debra Hilstrom is the co-chair of a new working
group charged with examining possible changes to the statute. See Thornton, supra
note 158, at 1; Expungement Law CLE, supra note 144, at 1:08:00 (discussing the
formation of the Expungement Working Group to address the statutory issues).
201. See Expungement Working Group Meeting #1, supra note 190, at 53:30
(statement of Matt Gehring, Legislative Analyst) (citing CRIMINAL & JUVENILE
JUSTICE INFO. POLICY GRP., REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON BACKGROUND CHECKS
AND SEALING OF CRIMINAL RECORDS (2008), available at https://dps.mn.gov
/divisions/bca/boards-committees/crimnet/Documents/Background%20Checks
%20and%20Record%20Sealing.pdf).
202. Geffen & Letze, supra note 10, at 1335 (“Expungement is defined at law
as an ‘extraordinary form of relief.’ It does not apply to every individual suffering
the detrimental effects of a criminal history . . . .”).
203. See Wayne, supra note 190, at 257.
204. Stuart & Zaske, supra note 38, at 922.
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205

restricted by the statute. In formulating a new statutory scheme, it
is this author’s contention that the following guidelines should be
considered.
The juvenile requirements must be completely disentangled
from the adult statute. The court made it abundantly clear in J.J.P.
206
that chapter 609A is not to govern juvenile adjudications.
Therefore, the statute must be completely rewritten to stand as an
independent statutory framework for juvenile expungements.
Special attention should be paid to the requirements of the
petition itself, which will have to be rewritten by the court system
notwithstanding any legislative action. It should encapsulate all
requirements for petitioners, including service, form, contents, and
any limitations. Currently, judges are caught between J.J.P.’s
interpretation of statutory authority under section 260B.198 and
the forced reliance on chapter 609A for technicalities. Creating an
independent framework will allow juvenile court judges to execute
legislative intent while preventing petitioners from appealing a
decision based on the forced reliance on chapter 609A.
The legislature will need to consider the tension between
petitioners’ interest in expunging their records, executive branch
agencies’ need to protect the parties they serve, and law
enforcement and prosecuting agencies’ responsibility in protecting
the public. The Council on Crime and Justice has provided its
suggestions for legislative reform concerning juvenile records: that
“arrest records, expunged records, and juvenile records may not be
requested or used for purposes of employment, housing, or
licensing, or for acceptance into programs of post-secondary
207
education.”
Additionally, it suggests that Minnesota Statutes
208
section 260B.198 be interpreted to extend to all juvenile records.
In stark contrast, the Minnesota County Attorneys Association
wishes to maintain access to criminal records, holding that it is a
209
“critical public safety function.” The Association rests on thirteen

205. See Thornton, supra note 158, at 20.
206. J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d 260, 269 (Minn. 2013).
207. MARK HAASE, COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RECORDS RELIEF
ACT SUMMARY (2013), available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/comm/docs
/ChampionMelinHaaseCriminalRecordsReliefActSummaryCCJ.pdf.
208. Id.
209. MINN. CNTY. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, MCAA EXPUNGEMENT PRINCIPLES 1 (2007),
available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/comm/docs/MNCoutnyAttorneys
AssocExpungementPrinciples.pdf.
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guiding principles to advise the legislature of its interests in future
expungement law reform—pushing for expunged records to be
210
sealed, not destroyed, so they can be accessible in the future. This
would support the primary goal of protecting the public interest
against the needs of individual petitioners who may recidivate at
211
some point.
The legislature should write the statute in accordance with the
language of J.J.P.—that is, the petitioner must demonstrate that the
benefit of an expungement to him outweighs the detriment to the
public and the burden on the court—in order to guide the district
courts in their evaluations of petitioners as distinct individuals.
Some petitioners will meet this burden and others will not, just as
some petitioners will be denied simply through their failure to
serve the correct parties. However, a new statute must be
constructed in such a way to give the petitioner who embodies the
entire purpose of the expungement process the ability to find
actual relief. It would behoove the Minnesota legislature to once
212
again be “in the vanguard of the reform trends” as the nation
deals with the impact of saddling its youth with records that can
prevent them from becoming productive members of society.
All parties are interested in a fair, predictable, and impartial
process, consistent between all Minnesota courts and individual
petitioners’ cases. Even the Minnesota County Attorneys
Association supports automatic judicial expungements for
petitioners in certain situations where charges were either
dismissed or where the case was decided in favor of the
213
petitioner. This is one area on which the legislature can focus its
attention in an effort to improve judicial efficiency, especially in
the case of juvenile records. While the legislature is in a prime
position to decide whether to address the gaps left by J.J.P., it

210. See id. at 1–2. Multiple principles address the availability of postexpungement records to affected agencies.
211. This is a nebulous equation. There are certainly petitioners who
recidivate and the public interest can therefore be harmed by the expungement of
these prior records. However, the expungement process is designed to assist those
people who have demonstrated positive, forward movement in their lives. The
assumption underlying expungement reform should not be that all petitioners
would at some point recidivate.
212. Walling & Driver, supra note 22, at 900.
213. The Association does not support the expungement of executive branch
records. MINN. CNTY. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, supra note 209, at 4.
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should be mindful of the particular mission of the juvenile justice
system.
V. CONCLUSION
The materialization of the court’s decision in J.J.P. has
resulted in consequences that the court might not have anticipated.
The mere fact that the majority addressed the plain meaning of
the word “expunge,” recognizing that it indeed means to “erase
or destroy,” conveys that the court’s intention was to deliver
a clear solution under the juvenile expungement statute
214
section 260B.198. However, in light of the court’s decision to
limit an expungement to the “order of adjudication” instead of the
entire process of adjudication as acknowledged by Justice Anderson
in his concurrence, the real-life impact is to deny petitioners the
relief the court is statutorily empowered to give. The combination
of confusion concerning the law in this area and the way in which
records are disseminated makes obtaining effective relief
215
difficult.
The biggest problem with the majority ruling is that it fails to
give relief at all to a “stay of adjudication” or other circumstance
216
where the decision may have been in the petitioner’s favor. It
seems contrary to legislative intent to produce a result in which an
individual who was fully adjudicated may have his or her record at
least partially restored, but an individual who was not adjudicated
217
cannot find relief.

214. See J.J.P. II, 831 N.W.2d 260, 267 (Minn. 2013).
215. See Telephone Interview with Jon Geffen, supra note 148 (“Nobody knows
what’s going on. Even the confusion at the supreme court level was significant.
People have tried to decipher the decision as it pertains to records, [but it’s
difficult].”).
216. See State v. C.P.H., 707 N.W.2d 699, 704 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (“In
determining whether a case was resolved in favor of the petitioner . . . the
existence of an admission or finding of guilt is the deciding factor.”).
217. A district court judge may use her inherent authority to expunge judicial
records. See State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. 1981). However, that
remedy is limited. When thinking of long-term consequences of an adjudication
under the J.J.P. ruling, it might make more sense for a juvenile to argue for
adjudication at the time of charging only so that he or she may qualify for an
expungement of executive branch records should one be warranted. It is hard to
believe that this “absurd and unreasonable” result was in fact the intent of the
majority in deciding to limit J.J.P. to the order of adjudication.
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Individuals who have borne the burden of proof under the
J.J.P. decision—that their benefit outweighs the burden on the
courts and public—deserve to be fully restored to the position they
were in before they were charged. The court has given no clear
reasoning for the conclusion that those who have rehabilitated
themselves and shown themselves to be productive members of
society should carry the burden of having to explain an arrest
record or miscellaneous court document. When the district court
has found that a petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated need in
the areas of education, housing, and employment to the extent that
the benefit of an expungement would outweigh the burden to the
courts and public, the petitioner has a right to expect that
expungement to have a practical effect. The courts, however, have
gone as far as they can within the current framework of the
statutory language. Therefore, until the legislature takes action,
petitioners will continue to face legitimate hardship in the wake of
the court’s ruling in J.J.P.
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